SunCorp

 It’s difficult to escape the sense of deja vu. The response to the latest terror outrage in Hyderabad was followed by the by-now familiar and stale drill—vows to bring the culprits to book, levelling charges, even if well-founded, against Pakistan and Bangladesh, condolences for victims and review meetings from the Prime Minister downwards.

People cannot be accused of being cynical if they dismiss these declarations as hollow and seem resigned for the next jehadi strike. For a country that for more than two decades now has been bled by relentless terror attacks, India has offered knee-jerk and sporadic attack-specific responses. In
fact, it has been in a state of denial, first by claiming that no Indian was messed up with Al Qaida, and when that proved to be wrong, describing this vicious campaign of violence as the handiwork of a “handful of misguided youth’’.
    The response has to change if the bleeding is to stop. The first corrective will come by recognising the huge problem. The right diagnosis is a pre-requisite for cure, and it ranges from acknowledging that the scourge is no fabrication by agencies to creating synergies among agencies, strengthening policing and creating the necessary political will. 

 Just raising elite teams isn’t enough nor is holding out threats to Pakistan sufficient. The key to the success of an honest counterterrorism initiative lies in a painstaking and sustained campaign to strengthen the criminal justice system and law enforcement machinery.
    For all our aspiration to be a superpower, the harsh fact is that a lethal blend of corruption, inefficiency and political meddling has enfeebled our criminal justice administration and sapped the police of will and strength to take on those killing the innocent.
    The investigation into the Hyderabad carnage is still on, but there are already pointers to suggest the loss of life on Saturday could have been averted if the police had been allowed to pick up some of the jehadi footsoldiers who have found a sanctuary in pockets of the Walled City.

Deaths Abound, Trails Go Cold India’s track record in cracking terror cases is pathetic.

Aug 25, 2007 | Hyderabad | 42 dead, 54 injured Suspects: HuJI, LeT| Status: 1 arrest | Mastermind absconding

May 18, 2007 | Mecca Masjid, Hyderabad 14 dead, 100 injured | Suspect: HuJI | Status: Case with CBI, 1 arrest at Bangladesh border, two sketches of suspects issued | Mastermind absconding

Feb 19, 2007 | Samjhauta Exp, Panipat | 68 dead, 125 injured Suspect: LeT | Status: No case | Arrests: 2, released later | Mastermind absconding

Jul 11, 2006 | Train Blasts, Mumbai | 187 dead, 700 injured Suspects: LeT, SIMI | Status: 13 arrests, no trial | Mastermind absconding

Oct 29, 2005 | New Delhi | 61 dead, 92 injured | Suspect: LeT Status: 3 arrested, trial on, 1 suspect killed in encounter in J&K | Mastermind absconding

July 29, 2005 | Shramjeevi Exp, Varanasi | 12 dead, 52 injured Suspects: LeT, HuJI | Status: 9 arrests, case on | Mastermind absconding

Aug 25, 2003 | Gateway & Zaveri Bazar, Mumbai | 53 dead, 161 hurt Suspect: LeT | Status: 5 arrests, no convictions, case on | Mastermind absconding

Sept 24, 2002 | Akshardham, Gandhinagar | 34 dead, 81 injured Status: 6 LeT terrorists arrested, 3 sentenced to death | Mastermind absconding Dec 13, 2001 | Parliament, New Delhi | 12 killed | Suspect: JeM | Arrests: 4 Convicted: 4 (1 death sentence, 1 RI, 2 acquitted) | Mastermind absconding

Feb 14, 1998 | Bomb blasts, Coimbatore 58 dead, 200 injured | Status: 158 convicted, 72 of Al Umma group, sentencing scheduled for Sept | Mastermind absconding

Mar 12, 1993 | Serial blasts, Mumbai | 257 dead 1,400 injured | Status: 129 accused, 100 found guilty

Main accused Dawood and Tiger Memon absconding 47,371

People died in terrorist violence (non-Naxalite) during 1994-2005 4,666

People died in Maoist violence during 2002-2006 Strengthen judicial system, bring extremists to book 

 One of the biggest hurdles India faces in fighting terrorism is the dangerous combo of corruption and inefficiency. It’s worth recalling that the deadly consignment of RDX used for killing 257 civilians in Mumbai in March 1993 could come in only because corrupt customs and police personnel thought they were letting in only the normal contraband.
    The fight is going to be a long haul and with no ‘supercop’ tags for those battling the hidden enemy. It will involve strengthening the legal architecture as well as the force on the ground. It’s illuminating that against a UN-mandated norm of 200 policemen for a population of 1,000, India has an average of 100 for 1,000, and in certain states it’s as low as 58:1000.
    Special laws are opposed in India. But the option for one which is least vulnerable to misuse should also not be ruled out because terror is no ordinary crime and because existing laws can easily be exploited by terrorists and their lawyers.
    Seemingly mundane steps—like strengthening the old-fashioned beat policing— are crucial. ‘Techint’, or technological intelligence, is vital for preempting the Internet-savvy terrorist, but it is no substitute, as Americans have realised at heavy cost, to ‘humint’ or human intelligence. Same for stemming the flow of funds to terrorists.
    The battle against the ruthless, elusive terrorist cannot succeed without partnering civil society. Citizens have to be sensitised to the risk and cost—from the inconvenience of navigating through police barriers after a long day to the risk of equipping agencies with powers fraught with the erosion of privacy. Even the US has had to do this to deal with this frightening foe.
    Terrorism in India is not a natural outgrowth. It has been organised and sustained by Pakistan which has never been able to mask its intent to use jehadi terror as a state instrument to extract concessions in J&K and harry India elsewhere. As in the case of other terrorist atrocities, the trail of the Hyderabad killers leads to Pakistan.
    This may not necessitate the cutting off of links with the neighbour. But it should certainly disabuse the decision-makers in Delhi of the notion that the enemy will change its stripes. A realist view, unblinkered by romantic notions, should be the first step towards scripting a plan to make Pakistan pay for its diabolical tactics.
    The state-civil society partnership is crucial because of the religious dimension of terrorism. Community/faith profiling is not just unfair, it can be counter-productive too by enhancing the appeal of jehadi propaganda.
    That said, nobody gains by ignoring that the jehadi tanzeems—with fanatical zeal to enforce their literal and rigid interpretations of centuries-old scriptures—have increasingly been successful in getting many to sign on their anti-India agenda. The onus of taking on these driven bands rests primarily with members of the community, for the simple reason that they come without the ‘outsider’ tag.
    The response so far has been far from satisfactory, but things can improve if political parties encourage those who are ready to introspect and stop interfering with the work of the police by using alibis of human rights violations or communal bias.
    Experience the world over shows that the battle against terrorism is a tough grind. There is no silver bullet available to us. That we are a democracy located in a neighbourhood which has long been the favourite hunting ground of religious terrorists renders the job even more difficult.
    India’s unenviable reputation as a ‘soft state’ is an invitation to terrorists who have included this country among their prime targets, along with the West and Israel. India’s growing relationship with the US, the prime jehadi target, makes it even more vulnerable.
    But the battle is not an impossible task. India is more than capable of winning, if only it joins it.